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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
January 10, 1986 
List 1, sheet 1 
Conference CJt--1 ~ ~ ~ 
/]__~~~~~ y. 85-701 
y/FEDERAL ELECTION 
~' 1-J~~ 
COMMN. Appeal om CAl (Rosenn-SCJ, 
Breye , Torruella) 
v. 
MASS. CITIZENS FOR LIFE, INC. Fed./Civ. Timely 
(corporate speaker) 
1. SUMMARY: The Federal Election Commission (FEC) 
challenges the CAl's decision that 2 u.s.c. §44lb, which 
of a candidate in connection with a federal election, was 
unconstitutional as applied to a nonprofit, "ideological" 
corporation making indirect, uncoordinated expenditures to 
express its views of candidates. 
2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: The Federal Election 
Campaign Act (FECA), 2 u.s.c. §44lb(a), makes it unlawful for a 




"to make a contribution or expenditure in connection 
with any election to any political office, or in 
connection with any primary election or political 
convention or caucus held to select candidates for any 
political office .••• " 
Section 44lb(b) (2) provides that the term "contribution or 
expenditure" shall include 
"any direct or indirect payment, distribution, loan, 
advance, deposit, or gift of money, or any services, or 
anything of value ..• to any candidate, campaign 
committee, or political party or organization, in 
connection with any election ...• " 
This section refers to election expenditures by corporations, 
which the Act prohibits unless such expenditures are made from 
segregated funds. §44lb(b) (2) (C). 
The general "definitions" section of FECA contains a broader 
definition of expenditure, which "includes" 
"any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, 
deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, made by 
any person for the purpose of influencing any election 
for federal office 11 2 U.S.C. §431(9) (A) (1) 
(emphasis added) • 
v;:ppee Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL) is a 
Massachusetts nonprofit, nonmembership corporation, organized 
~
"[t]o foster respect for human life and to defend the right to 
life of human beings, born and unborn, through education, 
~~
political and other forms of activities." App., at 3. Shortly 
before the September 1978 Massachusetts primary elections, MCFL 
published and distributed a flyer entitled "Special Election 
Edition." The flyer (a copy of which is included in the Juris. 
Stmt.) was headed "EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO VOTE PRO-LIFE." The ...______..... 
publication contained the voting records on abortion-related 
- 3 -
issues of many candidates for federal and state offices. It 
included at least two exhortations to "vote pro-life" and a 
- ·- -- --~~~---:> 
statement that "No Pro-Life Candidate Can Win In November Without 
Your Vote In September." The publication contained photographs 
only of those candidates who were considered "pro-life." At the 
back of the publication, next to the exhortation "Vote Pro-Life," 
Does Not Represent An Endorsement Of Any Particular Candidate." 
Copies of the Special Election Edition (along with a subsequently 
published correction sheet) were distributed to about 6,000 MCFL 
contributors and some 50,000 noncontributing supporters. MCFL 
also sent copies to local chapters and to individuals who 
requested them. The FEC contends that the rest of the 100,000 
copies printed were left in public areas for general 
distribution. MCFL spent a total of $9,812.76 from its general 
treasury in preparing, printing and distributing the 
publications. 
In response to a complaint, the FEC investigated and found ____.......__ 
probable cause to believe that MCFL violated 2 u.s.c. §44lb(a) by 
printing the flyers and distributing them to the general public. 
When conciliation proved unsuccessful, the FEC filed a complaint 
pursuant to 2 U.S.C. §437(g) (a) (6) (A), seeking a civil penalty 
and such other relief as the court deemed appropriate. 
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the 
DC (D. Mass., Garrity), and the court granted summary judgment 
for appee, holding that the two publications did not fit within 
the term "expenditure" in §44lb(b) (2). It also held that the 
- 4 -
publications were exempted from the prohibition against 
expenditures by §431(9) (B) (i), which exempts 
"any news story, commentary, or editorial distributed 
through the facilities of any ••• newspaper, magazine, 
or other periodical publication, unless such facilities 
are owned or controlled by any political party, 
political committee, or candidate." 
Finally, the court concluded that if §44lb were applied to 
prohibit appee's expenditures in connection with the publications 
in question, the statute would be unconstitutional, violating the 
organization's right to freedom of speech, press, and 
association. 
/ cAl affirmed. The court first rejected appee's (and the 
DC's) arguments that its expenditures were not covered by §44lb, 
and specifically found that those expenditures violated §44lb as 
alleged by the FEC. The court held that the Special Election 
Edition expressly advocated the election or defeat of clearly 
identified candidates, and that it did not fall within the 
statutory exemption for ne~sletters or periodicals codified in 
§431(9) (b) (i). 
Although it found that appee had violated §44lb, the court 
wen~ied to expenditures by nonprofit ( 
"ideological" corporations like MCFL, §441 was unconstitutional. 
may be justified only by a showing of substantial government 
\ 
interest. Although the statute permits appee to use its 
corporate funds to establish a voluntary, segregated fund to be 
used for political purposes, §44lb(b) (2) (C), the availability of 
' alternative methods of funding speech does not justify 
- 5 -
"eliminating the simplest method." App., at 20. Nor is the 
regulation necessary to protect a substantial government 
\..__..----·--· ·--------------------~-~~----....___, 
interest. The interests at stake in FEC v. National Right to 
Work Committee (NRWC), 459 U.S. 197, 207-208 (1982), are simply 
not present here. Because MCFL did not contribute directly to a 
political campaign, its expenditures did not incur any political 
debts from legislators. See FEC v. National Conservative 
Political Action Committee, 53 U.S.L.W. 4293, 4297 (1985) ("NRWC 
is consistent with this Court's earlier holding that a 
corporation's expenditures to propagate its views on issues of 
general public interest are of a different constitutional stature 
than corporate contributions to candidates.") Moreover, 
contributors to MCFL need not be protected from having their 
money used for expenditures such as the special election edition; 
individuals who contribute to MCFL do so because they support its 
anti-abortion position and presumably would favor expenditures 
for a publication that informs subscribers and others of the 
position of various candidates on the abortion issue. 
3. CONTENTIONS: APPNT - Appnt FEC attacks the judgment 
~
below on two grounds. (1) Section 44lb does not restrict 
. ' 
political speech, but merely prohibits the use of corporate and 
union treasury funds to reach the general public in support of, 
or opposition to, federal candidates. To make this limited 
purpose clear, Congress enacted in 1971 an explicit exception 
from the statute's prohibitory language, now codified as 2 u.s.c. 
§44lb(b) (2) (C), which allows corporations and unions to operate a 
voluntary, separate segregated fund for political purposes. A 
- 6 -
"separate segregated fund may be completely controlled by the 
sponsoring corporation or union, whose officers may decide which 
political candidates contributions to the fund will be spent to 
assist." NRWC, supra, 459 U.S., at 200 n. 4. Section 44lb would 
not prohibit MCFL from distributing the same election flyers to 
the same people in the same manner it did here, so long as it 
financed the distribution through a separate account containing 
contributions voluntarily designated for political purposes. 1 
Rather than disputing the Commission showing that §44lb has 
not had the effect of limiting corporate or union political 
speech, CAl found the statute unconstitutional because it 
eliminated what the court considered "the simplest method" of 
financing corporate speech. App., at 20. But this Court has 
upheld virtually all of the Act's requirements with respect to 
federal campaign financing without ever finding it necessary to 
determine whether there was a "simpler method" available. See, 
e.g., NRWC, supra (limitation on use of corporate funds to 
solicit contributions to finance political activities)~ Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 u.s. 1, 23-38 (1976) (prohibition of contributions 
to publicly financed candidates)~ id., at 60-82 (upholding 
reporting and recordkeeping requirements for political committees 
and individuals)~ California Medical Association v. FEC, 453 U.S. 
182, 197 (1981) (limitation upon contributions to political 
~ppnt notes that 
fund in 1980, and 
expenditures from 
MCFL did establish such a separate segregated 
that it has reported to the FEC of having made 
that fund in every federal election since. 
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committees). It is "well settled that '[t]he [First] Amendment 
does not forbid ... regulation which ends in no restraint upon 
expression or in any other evil outlawed by its terms and 
purposes.'" Lowe v. SEC, 105 S.Ct. 2557, 2581 n. 8 (1985) 
(WHITE, J., concurring). 
Finally, CAl's assertion that the First Amendment requires a 
general exemption from §44lb for corporations like MCFL because ------------ -......__-~--- ---..______......, 
of the Act's requirement of disclosure of certain contributors to 
all political committees, including separate segregated funds, 
was effectively rejected by this Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 
supra, 424 u.s., at 68 (upholding the reporting requirement 
against First Amendment attack as "the least restrictive means of 
curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption that 
Congress found to exist"). 
(2) Even if §44lb indirectly burdens corporate and union 
political speech to some extent by making fund raising less 
"simple," the statute plainly serves compelling governmental 
purposes. First, it is intended to ensure that the wealth that 
corporations and unions accumulate with the aid of special legal 
protections intended to serve other purposes cannot be diverted 
to the electoral process to incur political debts from candidates 
for federal elective office. See NRWC, supra, 459 u.s., at 207. 
The CAl found this purpose to be inapplicable here because 
"MCFL's expenditures did not incur any political debts from 
legislators." App., at 22. But the same could be said about the 
independent expenditures for solicitations made by the National 
Right to Work Committee; in fact, the CA in that case had 
- 8 -
concluded that such independent solicitation, without more, would 
neither corrupt officials nor distort elections. In reversing 
that decision, this Court emphasized that the constitutionality 
of §44lb should not be judged by evaluating the effects on the 
electoral process of the particular expenditure at issue. 
Rather, §441 is a valid "prophylactic measure" aimed at "the 
special characteristics of the corporate structure." NRWC, at 
210. MCFL's corporate structure carries the potential for 
influence that is the proper object of congressional regulation; 
whether or not debts were actually incurred in this case - does not 
alter the constitutional analysis. 
Second, §44lb is designed "to protect the individuals who 
have paid money into a corporation or union for purposes other 
than the support of candidates from having that money used to 
support political candidates to whom they may be opposed." NRWC, 
supra, at 208. There is no reason to assume, as CAl did, that 
anyone who supported MCFL's anti-abortion position would 
necessarily be willing to contribute to its efforts to elect 
candidates. Individuals who oppose abortion do not necessarily 
use this as the sole criterion for choosing candidates. It is up 
to Congress, not the Court of Appeals, to determine the 
desirability of ensuring an opportunity for corporate 
contributors to make an informed choice in this important area. 
Moreover, §44lb serves the congressional purpose of "total 
disclosure," see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 u.s., at 76, by requiring 
that corporations and unions make their political contributions 
and expenditures only from a separate segregated fund that, as a 
- 9 -
policital committee, is required to report both its expenditures 
and its sources of funding for disclosure on the public record. 
2 U.S.C. §434. If CAl's decision is permitted to stand, the 
voting public will be denied the identities of the individuals 
(and corporations) who finance the political expenditures of 
corporations like MCFL, information that Congress has reasonably 
determined to be important to maintenance of an informed 
electorate. 
APPEE - MCFL argues that if indeed its expenditures are 
prohibited by §44lb,2 that section is unconstitutional as applied 
in this case. MCFL essentially tracks the reasoning of CAl. 
(1) Section 44lb impermissibly regulates based on the 
2MCFL indicates that if the Court determines that this case 
is not appropriate for summary affirmance and sets it down for 
oral argument, it intends to raise and brief the following 
additional statutory and constitutional issues: 
(1) Whether §44lb prohibits the independent expenditures made 
by MCFL, since §44lb(b) (2) defines those expenditures that are 
prohibited and that section only includes expenditures made 
directly or indirectly to a candidate or campaign committee? 
(2) Whether §44lb prohibits MCFL's expenditures, which 
included no "express advocacy." 
(3) Whether MCFL's newsletter is exempt from §44lb's 
prohibition because it is a newsletter or periodical publication 
within the meaning of FECA? 
(4) Whether §44lb violates the Equal Protection Clause by 
impermissibly regulating the subject of expression and the 
identity of the speaker? 
(5) Whether the phrases "in connection with," "for the purpose 
of influencing," and "newspaper" contained in §44lb are 
unconstitutionally vague? 
- 10 -
political content of the speech in question. It also violates 
the guarantees of freedom of the press and freedom of 
association. Expenditure limits particularly impinge on 
associational rights because any limitation on independent 
expenditure "precludes most associations from effectively 
amplifying the votes of their adherents, the original basis for 
the recognition of the First Amendment protection of freedom of 
association." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 u.s., at 22. Since limits 
on expenditures have been found to violate an organization's 
associational rights, e.g., FEC v. NCPAC, 55 U.S.L.W., at 4297, 
clearly the total prohibition of expenditure by MCFL, simply 
because it has chosen to associate in a corporate form, undercuts 
its and its member's right of association. That MCFL now 
publishes its newsletter through a separate segregated fund is of 
no moment (and indeed should not be considered, see Fed. Rule 
Evid. 407). The segregated fund was created only after the in 
terrorem effect of enforcement proceedings by the FEC and was 
possible only after MCFL's articles of organization and bylaws 
had been amended to create membership categories. In addition, 
FECA's requirement that PAC's disclose the names of contributors, 
2 u.s.c. §434(b) (2), may be sufficient to deter political 
activities. 
(2) Nor does §44lb serve a sufficiently compelling 
governmental interest to justify the substantial restriction on 
the First Amendment rights of MCFL. Truly independent 
expenditures have scant potential for corrupting elected 
representatives. And even assuming there is a potential for a 
- 11 -
corrupting influence from large independent expenditures by 
business corporations, that danger simply does not exist in the 
context of minimal expenditures (in this case less than $10,000) 
by grass roots, nonpartisan, nonprofit, ideological organizations 
such as MCFL. FEC's second concern--that MCFL's publication of 
the special election edition may go against the desires of some 
its contributors--is misplaced. That publication merely provides 
an information service, leaving MCFL members free to decide to 
vote for candidates based upon whatever criteria they choose. 
4. DISCUSSION: CAl explicitly found that §44lb, as applied 
to MCFL's expenditures in this case, violated the First 
Amendment. Accordingly, this is a proper appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
~ -
§1252. 
On the merits, this case presents a substantial federal .....____ 
question. While CAl was not clearly wrong, appt rightly 
--··----~
identifies NRWC as providing substantial support for its 
. . . 
corporation's separate segregated fund. §44lb(b) (4) (C). The '-
~-----..-......... f3 r 
contested section allows a non-stock corporation to solicit funds~~~~ 
only of its "members." Resps in NRWC claimed that the term ~ 
"members" had to be defined very broadly in order to avoid 
infringing the corporation's First Amendment rights. This Court 
\ 
\rejected both the resps' broad reading of the term and its 
(constitutional challenge to a narrower interpretation. In so 
doing, the Court described and approyed of §44lb. It concluded ----- -___, 
- 12 -
that the twin purposes advanced above by the FEe--preventing 
wealth accumulated through special advantages accorded 
corporations from being converted into political "war chests," 
and protecting individual contributors from misuse of their 
contributions, were sufficiently compelling to justify the First 
Amendment intrusion by the regulations. 
~ 
Becaus~dealt only with the term "member" as used to 
define who may lawfully be solicited for contributions to a 
corporation's segregated fund, it is not necessarily controlling 
here (and hence summary reversal would probably be 
inappropriate). The discussion of the "member" issue, however, 
seems to rest on the premise that the limitations on corporate 
speech contained in §44lb are constitutionally permissible. It 
would be odd, in other words, for the Court to uphold 
,,' 
restrictions on who may be soli~ited for contributions to a 
corporation's segregated fund, and then to strike down as too 
restrictive the statutory scheme ~s a whole (of which the 
solicitation restrictions are a nonseverable part). 
Because this case plainly raises a substantial federal 
~--------------
question that seems too complicated to warrant summary treatment 
in either direction, I recommend noting probable jurisdiction. 
~
There is a motion to affirm. 
December 13, 1985 Moulton opn in petn 
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No. 85-701, Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life, Inc. (CA 1) 
Memorandum for File 
The question presented is whether § 44lb of the Federal 
Election Campaign Act is unconstitutional when applied to 
expenditures by nonprofit "ideological" corporations like 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., the appellee in this 
case. 
Section 44lb, entitled "Contributions or expenditures by 
national banks, corporations, or labor organizations", is 
printed in full at p. 75(a) et seq. of the Jurisdictional State-
ment. This section, like the entire Federal Election Campaign 
Act, is long, complex, and must have been written by a chess 
player. For present purposes, the first paragragh on page 3 
of appellant's brief summarizes the relevant provisions of ---- ~ -
§ 44lb. Perhaps the most important of these is that it -
prohibits "any corporation whatever" or any labor organization ----- - _______ ..---...----,, 
from utilizing 'treasury funds to finance contributions or 
~~
expenditures in connection with a Federal election. 
- -------- - ____, 
The appellee is a pro-life entity incorporated under 
Massachusetts law as a non-stock, non-membership corporation. 
It has distributed by mail a newsletter to some 6,000 people 
who have contributed or paid dues. These newsletters have 
contained articles of interest to pro-life people, but apparently 
No. 85-701 2. 
has not supported or ~-opposed political candidates. In Septem-
,;/ 
ber 1978, prior to the September primaries for the election of 
Massachusetts' candidates for Federal office, appellee pub-
lished an eight page "Special Election Edition" of its 
newsletter, and mailed it to 58,000 people. The cost of 
printing and distributing this edition was $9,812., paid for 
by the corporation from its general treasury funds. The front 
page headline read: "Everything you need to know to vote 
pro-life"; the newsletter listed the names of candidates, and 
reported their positions on pro-life issues. It did state, 
however, that no "particular candidate" was endorsed. The 
appellant (the Commission) does not dispute this. 
After an investigation by the Commission, it filed a 
complaint in the DC for Massachusetts alleging a violation of 
§ 44lb, and seeking a civil penalty as provided by the Act. 
v ' Jr 
Appellee admitted that it had expended corporate funds to ---- - ------------ ,. -
publish the Special Election Edition, but claimed that was not ----- .._,____ __ ----------- -~ 
an unlawful "expenditure" under the Act, and that in any event 
§ 44lb as applied to it was unconstitutional. On cross 
motions for summary judgment, the DC held that the expenditure 
by appellee did not violate § 44lb, ~t~~ation of 
" 
the Act to appellee's expenditures "would violate its rights 
to freedom of speech, press and association ... ". Joint 
Appendix p. 38(a). 
No. 85-701 3. 
The CA disagreed with the DC as to the applicability C:/1 1 
of § 44lb, and found that these expenditures violated 
that section as alleged by the Commission. The CA reasoned 
that the Special Election Edition expressly advocated the 
election of clearly identified candidates within the meaning 
of our decision in Buckley v. Valeo. Moreover, CA 1 held 
that this publication did not come within the exemption for 
certain activities of the media. IJk-r C'/1 I ~~be_ 
~fj'¥1./1 ~  
As noted above, the only question before us is the ~ ~ 
constitutionality of § 44lb as applied in this case. The 
brief on behalf of the Commission argues that CA 1 erred in 
holding that § 44lb, as applied to expenditures by non-
profit corporations, violates the First Amendment . It is 
emphasized that this section does not restrict the amount, 
content or method of corporate and union political speech. 
The Act does permit a corporation to use its treasury funds 
to establish a separate segregated fund to be used for political 
purposes, and such a fund can be controlled by the corporation 
or union so long as its money is kept separately. Appellant 
further argues that substantial governmental interests are 
involved, and that § 44lb (as applied) is consistent with the 
intent of Congress to insure that the electorate is fully 
informed not only about candidates and issues but also about 
No . 85-701 4. 
sources of campaign financing. Buckley v. Valeo, of course, 
is relied upon by appellant as well as appellee. 
In a brief unduly encumbered by an appendix that apparently 
includes the entire Federal Campaign Election Act, appellees 
argue first that the DC correctly held that the publication 
of this newsletter did not violate § 44lb. It notes that 
the definition of "expenditure" in§ 44lb(b)(2), applicable 
to corporation, proscribes only a "direct or indirect payment 
to any candidate." The newsletter, according to appellee, 
did not make any payment to a candidate, and indeed did not 
advocate "the election or defeat of clearly identified candi-
dates". Rather, it published the voting records of candidates, 
but did not urge that particular candidates be elected or 
defeated . [I note here, however, that the purpose of the 
newsletter clearly was to elect pro-life candidates. I am not 
persuaded by this line of argument, but do think appellee 
plausibly contends that the newsletter is a "newspaper" or 
"periodical publication", within the meaning of the Act, and 
therefore is exempt from the corporate prohibition.] Although 
the newsletter is not a "newspaper" in the normal sense of the 
term, this special edition of appellees' regular newsletter 
possibly can be viewed as a "periodical publication". 
No. 85-701 5. 
As to the constitutional issue, appellee of course argues 
the CA 1 correctly held that § 44lb is unconstitutional as 
applied to this publication. As would be expected, appellee 
relies on Buckley v. Valeo, and subsequent decisions under the 
Act. See brief, p. 23 et seq. 
I will not prolong this memo dictated only to refresh my 
recollection as to the issues. I need to devote a good deal 
more time to the case before coming to rest. The brief on 
behalf of the Commission is better written, and - on its face -
more persuasive than the rather unattractive brief for appellee. 
One quite telling argument by the Commission is that § 44lb does 
not in fact restrict corporate political speech. It only 
prohibits "the use of corporate and union treasury funds to 
reach the general public in support of, or opposition to, 
Federal candidates ... " (Emphasis added). Thus, if appellee 
had created a separate segregated fund, derived from contribu-
tions of subsribers or sympathizers, that fund could be used 
without limit to publish the corporation's views in support 
of, or in opposition to, any candidate. Thus, the burdening 
of First Amendment rights is - at most - quite limited, and 
as appellees' brief argues the Government interests are sub-
stantial. 
No. 85-701 6. 
I would welcome my Clerk's views. There are a number 
of decisions construing and applying this Act that I have had 
no opportunity to reread. I was one of the three Justices 
(with Stewart and Brennan) who wrote Euckley, but I do not 
have the more recent cases in mind. 
L.F.P. 
~PM-~~ (/ 
.5~ ~~ ~~~ ~-(.L? 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell August 19, 1986 
From: Leslie 
No. 85-701 
Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 
Inc. 
Cert. to CAl (Breyer, Rosenn, Torruella, C.J.s) 
Tuesday, Oct. 7, 1986 (last argument) 
I 
This is another in a line of cases presented to this 
Court challenging certain provisions of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 1971 (FECA), 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455. The question pre-
sented is whether §44lb, which prohibits corporations from making -------- -
expenditures in connection with federal elections, is unconstitu-
page 2. 
tional as applied to a nonprofit ideological nonmembership corpo-
ration. 
II 
This is an appeal from an enforcement action brought by 
the Federal Election Commission (FEC) against the Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL). MCFL is a nonprofit, nonmember-
ship corporation, organized "[t]o foster respect for human life 
and to defend the right to life of all human beings, born or un-
born, through education, political and other forms of activi-
ties." For several MCFL published 
/ 
irregu-years, a newsletter at 
lar intervals, between five and eight times a year. The list of 
receivers included all individuals who contributed to the organi-
zation, either through the payment of $15 per year in "dues" or 
any lesser amount, and when funds were available, expanded to 
include individuals who merely indicated interest in the organi-
zation. The circulation in May and October of 1978 were 2,109 
and 3,119, respectively. The MCFL newsletter typically contained 
information about MCFL's pro-life activities, and political de-
velopments in the area. 
MCFL sometimes published a "Special Elections Edition" 
prior to elections. In September 1978, it published 100,000 
copies of its "Special Elections Edition" headlined "Everything 
~ .. 'dh v' . You Need To Vote Pro-Life." The ed1 t1on conta1ne t e vot1ng 
records on abortion issues of many federal and state candidates, 
favorable pro-life votes marked with a "y" and unfavorable votes 
marked with an "n". The candidates were also rated with stars 
according to the totality of their records, with photographs of 
page 3. 
some of the most stellar candidates included. In several places, 
/ 
the edition stated "VOTE PRO-LIFE." On the back of the edition, 
beside one of these exhortations, was printed the caveat, "This 
1 special election edition does not represent an endorsement of any 




particular candidate." MCFL spent a total of $9,812.76 from its 
~··---·-· ·--~ 
general treasury on the Special Edition and 20,000 copies on a 
partial Special Edition published to correct errors in the first 
edition. Copies of the two Special Editions were distributed to 
5,985 MCFL contributors and 50,674 non-contributors. Other 
copies were sent to MCFL local chapters for distribution and the 
parties are in dispute over whether to additional copies were 
left in public areas for general distribution. 
/ 
The FEC determined that, by printing the special election 
editions, MCFL violated 2 u.s.c ~---f44i-bcaD which 
'----·----
makes it unlaw-
ful "for any corporation whatever ... to make a contribution or 
expenditure in connection with any election at which a Senator or 
Representative in ... Congress are to be voted for." The FEC 
filed a civil complaint pursuant to 2 U.S.C. §437g(a) (6) (A) seek-
ing a civil penalty and other appropriate relief. The DC found 
that the Special Editions did not meet the definition of "expen-
diture" applicable to § 44lb, because they were not 
didate." 
"to any can-




The DC also found that the editions were not pr,2._!? _i t~ ;> 
~ by 
~ Cv"' story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facili-
~--~~~· f ' ' ' ' I ' t1es o any ... per1od1cal publ1cat1on. 1 2 u.s.c. §431(9) (B) (1). 
§44lb because they qualified under an exception for ;-~ · 
Finally, the DC held that if §44lb were intended by Congress to 
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apply to the Special Editions it would be unconstitutional under 
the First Amendment because it would violate MCFL's freedoms of 
speech, press and association. Th~ ~DC relied on three factors in 
inding the statute unconstitutional as applied: first, that the 
danger of corruption did not exist because the expenditures were 
independent of any candidate or party; second, that MCFL's status - ~ 
as a nonprofit ideological corporation distinguished it from the 
profit-making corporations which Congress could legitimately seek 
to regulate; and t~~rd, that the purpose of the publication was 
direct political speech, not solicitation of contributions. 
The CAl affirmed on the constitutional grounds only. The 
CAl adopted a broader definition of "expenditure" in §44lb, and 
found that the Special Editions qualified. The CAl further found 
that the editions did not meet the "press" exception to the ex-
penditure regulation. 
£lie<L_ to I (. indirect, 
Finally, the CAl found that §44lb as ap--=--
uncoordinated expenditures by a non-profit -
ideological corporation expressing its views of political candi-
dates violates the organization's First Amendment rights." The 
CAl noted that nonprofit corporations could engage in the same 
political speech by forming a separately-funded political action 
committee (PAC), but held that the availability of other methods 
of funding speech did not justify eliminating the simplest meth-
od. The CAl based this decision on a finding that expenditures 
by nonprofit corporations~oes not pose the problem of corruption 
that §44lb was meant to ' address. Consequently, the government 
did not offer a substantial justification for the limitation on 
speech imposed. The FEC now appeals from the CAl's decision. 
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III 
Several cases form the background for the issue presented 
in this case. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975), the Court 
upheld limitations on contributions imposed by the FECA, but 
~&<-~ 
s~n similar limitations on expenditures. The Court also 
" upheld the FECA provision which requires all individuals and 
groups to report expenditures, so long as "expenditure" is limit-
ed to a communication that expressly advocates the election or 
defeat of a clearly identified candidate. 
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765 (1978) (Powell, J.), the Court held that a state could not 
constitutionally regulate corporate speech on issues of public 
concern, as opposed •to speech on candidate elections, since 
speech on issues does not pose a danger of corruption. 
The Court in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of 
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) held that a city may not constitu-
tionally limit the contributions to committees formed to support 
or oppose ballot measures, because again, the danger of corrup-
tion was only present in candidate elections. The Court found 
that freedom of association is diluted if it does not include the 
right to pool money through contributions since funds are often 
necessary if advocacy is to be effective. 
In Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work 
Committee (NRWC), 459 U.S. 197 (1982), the Court upheld one sub-
section of §44lb which provides that a corporation without capi-
tal stock may solicit contributions to a separate segregated fund 
for political activity only from "members," even as it was ap-
page 6. 
plied to a nonprofit nonmember advocacy corporation. In this 
context, the Court respected the "legislative judgment that the 
special character is tics of the corporate structure require par-
ticularly careful regulation," because substantial aggregations 
of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go with the 
corporate form of organization could be converted into political 
"war chests" which could be used to incur political debts from 
legislators who are aided by the contributions. 
The Court in Federal Election Commission v. National Con-
servative Political Action Committee (NCPAC), 105 S. Ct. 1459 
(1985) invalidated a limit on independent expenditures by politi-
cal committees. The Court found the First Amendment freedom of 
association squarely implicated, finding PACs to be "mechanisms 
by which large numbers of individuals of modest means can join 
together in organizations which serve to amplify the voice of 
their adherents." The Court stated that "preventing corruption 
or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and com-
pelling government interests thus far identified for restricting 
campaign finances," and the danger of corruption did not support 
wholesale regulation of the expenditures by PACs. Even if Con-
gress could have seen some danger of corruption from expenditures 
by large PACs, the regulation was fatally overbroad. 
.,/ ~r 
~ Several principles emerge from these cases. First, the 
only basis for regulating campaign financing is the danger of 
actual or apparent corruption of candidates . .,/ Second, contribu-
tions to candidates or their committees are likely to pose the 
danger of corruption, whereas independent enditures are not. 
~~--~--~~~---
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Third, corporate speech as to candidates may be limited because 
it may pose the danger of corruption, but corporate speech as to - - "--
issu~s does not pose a corruption danger and so may not be regu-
lated. ~ Fourth, Congress may determine that certain dangers are 
inherent in the corporate form and may adopt prophylactic meas-
ures regarding contributions addressed to all corporations, large 
and small, profit and nonprofit. v/ Fifth, a prophylactic measure 
which impinges on associational and speech rights without a jus-
tification in preventing corruption is overbroad. 
v 
The statutory scheme as it now exists reflects these 
principles to a large extent. A "person" is any individual or 
group, including a political committee or corporation. 2 u.s.c. 
§431(11). All persons are subject to contribution limitations. 
2 U.S.C. §44la. Persons are subject to no limitation on expendi-
tures, except that they must disclose "independent expenditures" 
in excess of $250 per year, defined as communications which ex-
pressly advocate the election or defeat of a particular identi-
fied candidate. 2 u.s.c. §434(b). Corporations are subject to 
an absolute bar on "contributions and expenditures". 2 u.s.c. 
§44lb. They may, however, form a separate segregated fund (PAC). 
2 u.s.c. §44lb(b). The PAC can solicit contributions from the 
executive personnel and stockholders of a profitseeking corpora-
tion, and from the members of a nonprofit corporation. 2 u.s.c. 
§44lb(b). A political committee is a PAC or any group under the 
control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomi-
nation or election of a candidate, Buckley, 424 u.s. at 79, which 
receives contributions or makes expenditures in excess of $1000 
per year. 2 u.s.c. §431(4). There is no limit on expenditures 
by political committees, except that they are subject to exten-
sive reporting requirements. 2 u.s.c. §434. 
A. Interpretation of "Expenditure" 
The first question presented in this case is one of statu-
tory interpretation. The DC found that the MCFL Special Editions 
did not fit within the definition of "expenditure" in §44lb. The 
CAl found that they did. This Court is faced with a choice. It 
can construe the statute narrowly, as did the DC, and avoid ad-
dressing the constitutional question directly, or it can adopt a 
broad interpretation of the statute and determine whether the 
broad definition is constitutional as applied. Neither the nar-
row nor the broad definition is completely supported by the stat-
utory language and legislative history. 
1. Narrow Definition of "Expenditure" 
-~ The CAl found the funds spent in publishing the Special 
t.fd J' ~Editions to be an "expenditure" under §44lb. Section 44lb pro-
·'r~~ ~ r ff'l"" hibits "any corporation whatever" from making "a contribution or 
expenditure in connection with any election " Subsection 2 ··~ . ~)1-~ (~) (2) provides that "[f) or purposes of this section •.. , the 
,~ ~erm "contribution or expenditure" shall include any direct or 
~ ~~ Ll1ndirect payment, ... , or anything of value ... to any candidate, 
~ campaign committee, or political party or organization, in con-
nection with any election ..•• " The general definitions section 
of the FECA contains a bro~~er def..ipi tion of "expenditure" to 
include " any purchase, . . . or anything of value, made by any 
person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal 
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office." This section further states that "expenditure" does not 
include "any payment made or obligation incurred by a corporation 
or a labor organization, which under section 44lb(b) of this 
title, would not constitute an expenditure by such corporation or 
labor organization." These sections read together appear to lim-
it the prohibition of corporate expenditures to the definition of ~ 
expenditures in §44lb. There appears to be no other reason to 
have a separate definition of expenditure in §44lb and explicitly 
to limit the general definition to the separate definition as 
applied to corporations and labor unions. 
Despite the words of the statute, an examination of the 
...._ ....__ "" 
legislative history indicates that it is unlikely that Congress 
intended to limit the definition of "expenditure" in §44lb to -- --what is in effect an indirect contribution. The Court in Buckley 
--·--~-----~~- _________...___ --
found indirect contributions to fit within the definition of 
"contribution." 424 u.s. at 78. The retention of the word "ex-
penditure" in the statute after Buckley would thus be superflu-
ous. If the retention of the words "to any candidate" in the 
definition of "expenditure" in §44lb nevertheless requires expla-
nation, these words could be read to distinguish corporate spend-
ing on issues, protected under Bellotti, from corporate spending 
on candidate elections. Read in this way, the words do not nee-
essarily limit expenditures "in connection with" candidate elec-
tions. 
Neither the narrow nor the !:>~ of "e-~endi­
ture" in §44lb is completely supported by the language or con-
------.... -
gressional intent. The narrow definition, however, appears to 
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stretch congressional intent further and run the risk of judicial 
legislating. Moreover, the result of a narrow interpretation 
would be to exempt most expenditures by all corporations and 
labor unions from coverage under §44lb. Although the narrow in-
terpretation would save the constitutionality of §44lb, it may 
not be appropriate when the result is to alter greatly the appar-
ent statutory coverage. 
2. Broad Definition of "Expenditure" 
The other way to interpret §44lb is as the CAl did --
-that "expenditure" incorporates the broad definition of §431. 
The Buckley Court found the broad definition "for the purpose of 
influencing" an unconstitutionally vague basis for imposing 
criminal sanctions and limited the definition to expenditures 
which expressly advocate the election or defeat of a particular 
candidate. The CAl did not decide whether the "express advocacy" 
limitation of Buckley applies to the corporate definition of "ex-
penditure" because it decided that the MCFL Special Editions met 
this definition. 
There is statutory support for the position that Congress 
did not intend to apply the "express advocacy" limitation to the ., 
definition of "expenditure" in §44lb. Congress specifically 
amended the FECA to include a definition of "independent expendi-
ture". If Congress had intended it to apply to corporate expen-
ditures, it could have changed the language in §44lb from "expen-
diture" to "independent expenditure". Nevertheless, if §44lb is 
not read to include the "express advocacy" limitation, under 
Buckley it would be unconstitutionally vague because criminal 
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sanctions may be imposed for a violation. Moreover, the "express 
advocacy" limitation imposed in Buckley was specifically aimed at 
disclosure requirements. Because the formation of a PAC requires j 
disclosing all contributors, the disclosure safeguard of Buckely 
should apply. 
One alternative would be for the Court to find that Con-
gress did not intend the "express advocacy" limit to apply to the 
definition of "expenditure" in §44lb and to invalidate §44lb as 
unconstitutionally vague. This decision, however, would be very 
narrow and of short duration since Congress could amend §44lb to 
contain the limit and the same challenge now presented would re-
~~ cur in a few years. The better alternative appears to be for the 
~~t to adopt the position it did in Buckley and "construe the 
; • {/0" 
~ ,• statute, if that can be done consistent with the legislature's 
j?-]--p.Jw-'- purpose, to avoid the shoals of vagueness." 424 U.S. at 78. 
If this interpretation of "expenditure" in §44lb is 
adopted that "expenditure" actually means "independent expen-
diture" as defined in the FECA -- then it is necessary to deter-
mine whether the MCFL Special Editions meet the definition. The 
exact 1befinitio~ as stated in~uckley is: 
expenditures for communications that in express terms 
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified 
candidate for federal office. This construction 
would restrict the application to communications 
containing express words of advocacy of election or 
defeat, such as "vote for," "elect," "support," "cast 
your ballot for," "Smith for Congress," "vote against," 
"defeat," "reject." 424 u.s. at 44 & n. 52. 
In finding the Special Editions to meet the definition, the CAl 
relied on the facts that the editions several times said "VOTE 
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PRO-LIFE", contained pictures of the candidates, and were dis-
tributed to a wide audience of nonmembers. 
Whether the Special Editions meet the definition of "ex-
press advocacy" is a very close question. The FEC has recently l 
revised its regulations to state that distribution of voting ~ 
records alone does not constitute an "independent expenditure." 
11 C.F.R. §114.4 (b) (4), (5). The only way that these editions 
went beyond voting records was that they connected voting record 
with issues, and advocated votes based on the candidates' records 
on the issues. The Buckley Court emphasized that "[f]unds spent 
to propogate one's views on issues without expressly calling for 
a candidate's election or defeat are •.. not covered." 434 U.S. 
at 44. In one sense, the editions merely advocated a position on -a particular issue. The editions further stated, however, that 
~
the issue should form the basis for choosing candidates. The 
implication of this is that the editions supported particular 
candidates according to their positions on the issue. There is a } 
I 
very fine line between saying "Vote for 
Pro-Life" next to a picture of Jones with 
ing record. 
Jones" and saying "Vote 
a stellar pro-life vot-
a. Narrow Definition of "Express Advocacy" 
The most straightforward application of Buckley to the \ 
facts of this case results in a finding that the Special Editions 
are ~tutsid; the narrow definition of 
~
the Buckley Court found an unlimited 
"express advo~". B , 
definition of "expenditure" 
unconstitutionally vague because it had "the potential for encom-
passing both issue discussion and advocacy of a political re-
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sult." 424 u.s. at 79. Here, the Special Editions can be viewed 
. '1 '~ . d"" as primari y Issue-oriente , with the candidates incidentally 
benefiting from the expenditure because of their positions on 
'-----., 
pro-life issues. ~ because the Special Editions contained 
the voting records of hundreds of candidates, the connection be-
tween the advocacy and a "particular candidate" was attenuated. 
Third, the disclaimer on the back of the first Special Edition, 
that it did "not represent an endorsement of any particular can-
didate," may be read to mitigate the effect of any advocacy. Fi-
nally, the Buckley Court did not appear disturbed by the prospect 
that many expenditures of benefit to a candidate's campaign would 
not constitute "express advocacy": "So long as persons and 
groups eschew ["express advocacy"] • • • I they are free to spend as 
much as they want to promote the candidate and his views." 424 
u.s. at 45. 
A finding that the MCFL Special Editions do not consti-
tute "express advocacy" should be based on some principle that 
the lower courts will be able to apply. Any definition which 
I attempts to distinguish issue will be very difficult to apply. advocacy from candidate advocacy Here, it is clear that the Spe-
cial Editions were published by an issue-oriented group. But 
future applications will be more ambiguous. Individuals and 
groups usually do not support candidates in the abstract, but 
instead base their support on the candidate's views on issues. 
So, in the context of candidate elections the distinction be-
tween iss~ and candidate advocacy appears illusory. For exam-
.,...--- ------ ----. ---v- ....--. - -· -
ple, on which side of the "express advocacy" definition would a 
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flyer which said "Vote reduced military spending" next to a pic-
ture of Smith fall? The only apparent bright line would be that 
"express advocacy" requires that a word of exhortation, e.g., 
"vote", be verbally connected with the name of a candidate. Any 
less rigid standard would require lower courts to make fine dis-
tinctions in emphasis and wording. This narrow definition would 
exclude the MCFL Special Editions from coverage under §44lb and 
resolve the case. 
b. Broad Definition of "Express Advocacy" 
Reading Buckley as a whole, however, a broader definition 
"express advocacy" may be justified. The primary application 
of the "express advocacy" definition is in 2 U.S.C. §434(c), 
which requires that all "persons" disclose all "independent ex-
penditures" and the primary contributors thereto. Thus, a narrow 
definition of "express advocacy" would not only exclude any cor-
porate expenditures similar to the MCFL Special Editions from 
regulation under §44lb, it would also exclude these types of ex-
penditures from any type of disclosure. The Buckley Court recog-
nized Congress' strong interest in achieving "total disclosure" 
by reaching "every kind of political activity." 434 u.s. at 76 
(quoting S. Rep. No. 92-229, p. 57 (1971)), primarily because 
disclosure helps voters to define the candidates' constituencies. 
Where a communication contains words of exhortation such as "Vote 
for .... " and pictures of candidates, it appears to be an expen-
diture that Congress could legitimately require be disclosed for 
the informational purpose of defining a candidate's constituency. 
Here, the fact that certain candidates are supported by a pro-
l 
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life group may be extraordinarily relevant to voters on both 
sides of the pro-life debate. Disclosure in fact furthers public 
information rather than stifling it. For this reason, the defi-
nition of "expenditure" as it relates to disclosure regulations 
may be viewed differently than as it relates to expenditure limi-
tations. 
Congress' interest in disclosure exists whenever a par-
ticular constituency indicates its support for a particular can-
didate. Thus, the appropriate test would be that where a commu-
nication contains "advocacy" ("vote for") and one or more "par-
ticular candidates" it should constitute "express advocacy". 
This definition would allow lower courts to distinguish between 
publications which contain nonpartisan voting records, which sim-
ply portray every candidate's vote without expressing a point of 
view, and those which incorporate advocacy and therefore indicate 
support by a particular constituency for a particular candidate. 
Applying this definition to the MCFL Special Editions, they would 
constitute "express advocacy" and thus qualify as "expenditures" 
under §44lb. 
B. Press Exemption 
If the MCFL Special Editions are found to fit within the 
§44lb definition of "expenditure" because they constitute "ex-
press advocacy", then it is necessary to determine whether they 
are nonetheless exempt from censure because they fall within the 
"press" exemption 
that: " [ t] he term 
story, commentary, 
from "expenditure." This exemption provides 
'expenditure' does not include any news 
or editorial distributed through the facili-
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ties of any broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other 
periodical publication, II 2 U.S.C. §431(9) (B) (i). The CAl 
found that the MCFL newsletters were not "periodical publica-
tions" and thus that the Special Editions were not "distributed 
through the facilities of any ... periodical publication." The 
CAl assumed arguendo that the MCFL newsletter was a periodical 
publication but found that the Special Editions did not qualify 
for the exemption because their circulation was 20 times that of 
any edition of the newsletter, they did not carry the MCFL news-
letter masthead, nothing in them informed readers that they were 
related to the newsletter, and the Special Edi toins were pub-
lished by a different staff. 
The press exemption was adopted in 1974. The House Re-
port indicates that it was intended not to limit freedoms of 
press or association, and that it was intended to conform the 
statute to preexisting law. One important element of preexisting 
law was a statement by this Court that: 
[i]t would require explicit words in an act to convince 
us that Congress intended to bar a trade journal, a 
house organ or a newspaper, published by a corporation, 
from expressing views on candidates or political pro-
posals in the regular course of publication. United 
States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 123 (1948). 
The MCFL newsletter appears like a trade journal. However, the 
~ ~ourt also noted that: 
[i] t is one thing to say that trade or labor union 
periodicals published regularly for members, stockhold-
ers or purchasers are allowable ... and quite another 
to say that in connection with an election occasional 
pamphlets or dodgers or free copies widely scattered 
are forbidden. Ibid. 
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Here, the CAl relied upon the fact that the Special Edi-
tions were distributed widely to individuals not accustomed to 
recieving the periodical. If such facts were found to fit the 
press exemption, then any publication by a corporation which re-
sembled a newsletter would be protected, no matter what its dis-
tribution and no matter how blatant and vehement its advocacy. 
When a communication falls within the it falls 
co~~~~~CA. There is no disclosure requirement, 
expenditure limitation, or contribution limitation. Because this 
exemption is so drastic, it should be limited to truly press-
related statements. The limitation implied in CIO that the press 
exemption should apply only to communications published and dis-
tributed in the regular course of business and in the same manner 
as the trade journal itself appears a sensible and enforceable 
line to draw. 
C. Constitutionality of §44lb as Applied 
-----------~--------~-------------
If the MCFL Special Editions are found not to fit the 
press exemption, then §44lb ostensibly forbids MCFL from publish-
ing them unless it forms a PAC. The FEe - argues that §44lb does 
... 
not limit speech at all, it simply imposes necessary safeguards. 
MCFL, however, claims a number of burdens from forming a PAC. · 
~
~ if corporations like MCFL have . to form .. PACs, then they 
must change into membership organizations, since nonstock corpo-
rations can only solicit PAC contributions from "members." NRWC. 
This impinges on the corporation's chosen method of organization 
and limits the individuals from whom it can seek contributions 
since many individuals will not want to become members. ~ 
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the burdensome administrative and record-keeping requirements 
severely impinge on the ability of a small corporation like MCFL 
to use its limited funds for political communication. Third, the 
FECA requires PACs to disclose the names of contributors. This 
would deter the small contributors upon which an organization 
like MCFL relies. 
- ~ ;:. 
( 'ghts, 
If a regulation imposes any burden on First Amendment 
\\ 
then the government must show a ~ompelling justification 
....._______ --- -------
that is narrowly tailored to meet the perceived threat. Buckley, 
\ ~ ~--~~ 
~~ 434 u.s. at 25. The principles developed in previous cases form 
(/"""~ t : e framework for this analysis. The "on~mate and com-
v'~ pelling government i~sts thus far iOentified for restricting 
~ ~ ~ampaign finances [is the] preventing [of] corruption or the ap-
~ . pearance of corruption." NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1469. The danger 
~~ ~rrupti~n has only thus far been tied to contributions, not 
~~~-~ to expenditures. In fact, even PACs, which are explicit politi-
~ cal advocacy machines, cannot constitutionally be subject to an 
expenditure limit. NCPAC. The only justification for the expen-
diture limits of §44lb would appear to be that Congress has 
rightly discerned a danger of corruption stemming from the "cor-
porate form." The Court has upheld the "corporation" classifica-
~J...~~ 
tions when contributions were at issue. NRWC. It has -at rtiek 
.dewt! a classification "which indiscriminately lumps with c~ra­
tions any 'committee, association or organization'" where e en-
ditures were at issue. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1471. 
~ ~ light of these principles, the Court can take three 
~ ~· ' ' ~.41 d h ld h II r~:-----tllf~rent pos1 t10n...§...: / the Court coul o t at corpora-
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tions" is a valid congressional classification for all campaign 
regulation purposes because of their special attributes, and up-
hold §44lb as applied in this case. ~· the Court could rely 
on the contribution/expenditure distinction and find that Con-
gress cannot limit corporate expenditures because they do not 
pose the danger of corruption. Third, the Court could rely on 
the danger of corruption as the only legitimate basis for regu-
lating campaign funding and find that expenditures by nonprofit 
corporations do not pose this threat. ~ 
The first route seems the weakest~ This Court has con-
sistently looked at the facts of each individual case and weighed 
-~---~-~ ~·~""""'----
the impact of the regulation on the particular speech against the 
governmental interest asserted. The strongest argument in favor 
of the FEC is that the regulation at issue does not completely 
bar speech, it only channels it. Nevertheless, in the context of 
a small, low budget corporation, this argument is not compelling. ----=----...._______.. 
The very essence of this Court's decisions invalidating campaign 
financing regulations is that~is necessary for~ The 
requirement that a corporation form a PAC diverts money from 
speech to administrative costs and therefore burdens speech rath-
er than merely channeling it. As to the government's compelling 
interest, the danger of corruption here does not appear any ~ 
greater than in NCPAC, where the Court invalidated expenditure 
limitations on PACs. The Court found the statute "fatally 
overbroad" because it was "not limited to multimillion dollar war 
chests; its terms apply equally to informal discussion groups 
that solicit neighborhood contributions to publicize their views 
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II 105 S. Ct. at 1470. Here, ~FL ~ t. It is 
a grass roots organization that sells roses and holds car washes 
to raise money. The Court in NCPAC reiterated the distinction 
between contributions and expenditures, finding that the absence 
of prearrangement and coordination of PAC spending undermined the 
danger of corruption. Exactly the same rationale should hold 
true in this case. The expenditures were completely uncoordinat-
'---.------.....--.....__- --~ -~. '-· ~
:a~ in fact much more so than most PAC spending. The candidates 
here were supported because of already established voting 
records. The publication was more a recognition of deeds already 
'----" - -~---... -- ----
done than a call to begin bestowing favors on a constituency. 
Another justification offered for the broad "corpora-
tions" category is that it is necessary to effectuate the expen-
diture limits on big, powerful corporations which do pose a dan-
ger of corruption. This Court has refused to uphold campaign 
financing regulations on the basis that they close loop-holes in 
other valid rules. Buckley, 434 u.s. at 80-81. Moreover, where 
a regulation infringes a First Amendment right, "[p]recision of 
regulation [is] the touchstone." Buckley, 434 u.s. at 41 
(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). There ap-
pears to be no reason why the FEC could not adopt more functional 
categories which address a real corruption danger, if there is 
one. The FEC could, for example, limit the category to corpora-
tions over a certain net profit, if war chests are the real dan-
ger. The FEC also claims that big corporations and other power-
ful individuals could funnel money through ideological corpora-
tions and thereby avoid contribution and disclosure requirements. 
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That is not, however, possible. Any group which makes independ-
ent expenditures over $250 per year must disclose all contribu-
tors of over $200, and identify any contributor of over $200 who 
earmarked the funds for a political purpose. 2 u.s.c. §434 (c). 
These requirements imposed on all groups and individuals ensure 
that all contributions over $200 and all expenditures over $250 
will be disclosed. 
I ' \.... 
The second -ZQ.Ute, distinguishing between contributions 
........=-== -.-
•r , , 
and expenditures, is well supported in this Court's recent cases 
and is already reflected to a large extent in the FECA. It is an 
}.-
~ .,.., e a'sy principle ~pply, and if it were adopted, should reduce 
b{~~wer court confusion substantially. One problem with this route "yi;~- .LC 
~.W ~at it appears that four justices no longer agree with the 
,Pv ~~d' . • 
\__ ~ ~ · 1St1nct1on. See NCPAC, 105 s. Ct. at 1481 (The justices are 
BURGER, WHITE, BLACKMON and most recently, MARSHALL). It is un-
clear what the result of a change in the Court will be. The sec-
ond problem with this route is that the easy answer may not be 
I( 
the best one. There is a strong argument that unlimited expendi-
\\ - --·-
tures by large corporations could indeed pose the danger of cor-
-------
ruption. It is inconceivable to me that if Xerox spends a lot of _.... 
money independently advancing an individual's candidacy, that the 
fact is not brought to the individual's attention. If a candi-
date knows of a large expenditure, it seems that the danger of 
corruption is there. The Court has reiterated that multimillion 
dollar war chests may pose a danger of corruption. The Court may 
want to leave open the option to Congress to tailor a statute 
which rationally isolates for regulation those war chests, be 
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they corporations or PACs, whose expenditures pose a real danger 
of corruption. 
The third route appears the best one. In NCPAC, the ---... 
~~~
Court invalidated as overbroad a statute which limited the expen--
di tures of corporations, committees, associations or organiza-
tions. The Court declined to adopt a limiting construction to 
save the statute, primarily because it found no legislative indi-
cation that Congress would be content with the new construction. 
The same method could be employed in this case. The statute 
could be_!~~alida~ed, be~_:_ it in~crim~nately ~es ex- r 
penditures which do not pose a danger of corruption. The princi-
-----------· ple of a link to potential corruption could be rearticulated, and 
Congress left free to redraft a statute which meets this require-
ment. 
IV 
In sum, Congress appears to have i~ed that the defi-
nition of "expenditure" in §44lb go beyond indirect contribu-
tions. Under Buckley, however, the definition must be limited to 
"express advocacy". Whether the MCFL Special Editions constitute 
"express advocacy" is a close questi'on:~ order to preserve the 
disclosure requirements of the FECA, it may be better to adopt a 
definition of "express advocacy" which applies whenever an iden-
- ·- ---- --'----=::::>--
tified constituency advocates gertain candidate's in an election, 
whether or not the constituency is issue-oriented. This defini-
tion of "express advocacy" means that §44lb is unconstitutionally - -· - ----- ------ --...__ ....___ broad as applied to an organization like MCFL, because the re--
quirement that a corporation form a PAC in order to engage in 
political speech burdens the members' rights to speak and to as-
sociate without the justification that it is necessary to address 
a threat of corruption. The best approach appears to be for the 
Court to invalidate the section as unconstitutionally broad, 
leaving Congress the option to tailor the statute to reach corpo-
rations whose expenditures present an identifiable threat of cor-
ruption. 
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To: Justice Powell October 9, 1986 
From: Leslie 
No. 85-701 
Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life 
Supplementary Memorandum 
Massachusetts Citizens For Life (MCFL) is a nonmember 1 
ideological organization. It claims that 2 u.s.c. §44lb, which 
requires that as a corporation it form a PAC in order to engage 
in independent expenditures relating to candidate elections, is 
1 MCFL eventuall sta lished PAC, and amended its Articles 
of Organization an bylaws to create members~ cate~ories. MCFL 
objects to reference to this t act i:i"fiier F"ed. 'R"O'"Evlcf . 407. MCFL 
insists that it only formed the PAC and became a membership 
organization due to the in terrorem effect of the FEC enforcement 
proceedings. 
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unconstitutional as applied to it. To succeed in its challenge, 
MCFL must prove that the statute imposes a significant burden on 
its First Amendment rights, and that the statute is not narrowly 
tailored to further legitimate governmental objectives. 
To determine the burdens that MCFL will suffer as a re-
sult of the statute, it is necessary to determine the extra bur-
dens MCFL would suffer if it were forced to form a PAC to make an 
independent expenditure. 2 There are ~s. ~' ~ lot:L 
MCFL would have to change into a membership corpotation in order 
to be able to solicit funds for the PAC. Section 44lb(4) (C), as ~~ Jv 
interpreted by this Court, limits solicitation for corporate PACs 
~
to the corporation's members. Thus, any time that MCFL solicited 
funds for independent expenditures, it would have to ensure that 
it solicited only from members. This would prohibit activities 
such as bake sales, car washes, or passing the hat after a meet-
ing to collect funds which might be used to make independent ex-
penditures. MCFL could engage in such activities to fund the 
organization itself, just not to fund independent candidate-
related expenditures. MCFL would thus have to isolate funds 
which could be used for independent expenditures from those which 




indepengent;, _e;qzendi ture is an expenditure by a group .,_. ~ JJ.. 
expressly advocating tne e~ction or defeat of a clearly ~-, 
identified candidate which is made without cooperation or o1 q, ~~~ 
consultation with any candidate. Since we have reached the ~-
constitutional issue, we assume that the MCFL newsletter at issue ~~ ~ ~. 
was an independent expenditure. Thus, the relevant comparison is ~~ 
between the burdens MCFL would suffer to make such an expenditure 
if it had to form a PAC, as opposed to the burdens MCFL would 
suffer to make such an expenditure if it did not have to form a 
PAC to do so. 
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The second burden is the administrative, record-keeping, 
r---
and reporting requirements for PACs. A PAC must have a treasurer 
who files reports pursuant to 2 u.s.c. §434. The reports must be 
quarterly or monthly and include: (1) the cash on hand at the 
beginning of the reporting period: (2) the total amount of re-
ceipts in a number of different categories: (3) the identifica-
tion of all contributors of over $200: (4) itemization of all 
disbursements: and (5) the sum of contributions offset by operat-
ing expenses. The reporting requirements for MCFL if it were not 
required to form a PAC are that if it made an independent expen-
di ture over $250, it would have to report all contributors of 
over $200, and identify whether such contribution was earmarked 
for an independent expenditure. 
,, 
It is important to note that as far as disclosin_g_ the 
'" 
names of )Contributors~ the requirement that MCFL form a PAC does 
not require losure. Both as a PAC and as a group 
making independent expenditures over $250, MCFL would have to 
disclose contributors of over $200. The fact that the disclosure 
of contributors for a PAC and for a group making independent ex-
penditures is the same cuts both ways. On the one hand, it weak-
ens MCFL's argument as to the additional burdens it will suffer 
by having to form a PAC. On the other hand, it weakens the gov-
ernment' s argument that § 44lb is necessary in order to compel 
full disclosure. 
It appears that the burdens mentioned above are signifi-
H 
cant enough to require that the statute be narrowly tailored to 
serve legitimate objectives. First it is necessary to determine 
... 
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whether it serves legitimate governmental purposes as applied to 
MCFL. As mentioned above, the statute will not further the gov-
ernment's interest in disclosure of contributors. The government 
argues that large corporations will be able to funnel money 
through small ideological corporations, but this is not true be-
cause any contribution over $200 would have to be disclosed. The 
government also argues that the extensive PAC reporting require-
ments are necessary to keep corporations honest. That is, with-
out the requirements small ideological organizations can act as 
funnels without reporting contributions as required by law. 
First, this assumes that these corporations will behave illegal-
ly, which is a problematic assumption. Second, any organization 
primarily organized to support political candidates must register 
as a political committee, and thus be subject to the PAC require-
ments. With any organization not primarily organized to support 
candidates, the danger that it will act as a corporate funnel 
appears remote. 
The government also argues that §44lb is necessary to 
protect innocent contributors to the corporation from having 
their money used to make independent expenditures on behalf of 
candidates. The question here is: is it important to protect 
the person who buys a cake at a bake sale, or gives a donation 
when the hat is passed, from having their money used by the orga-
nization for political purposes. It appears that this concern is 
much more rationally directed profit-making corporations and 
labor unions. With those organizations, their share-holders and 
members are associated with the organization for a purpose much 
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different from politics and often related to economic necessity. 
Thus, their "contributions" to the corporation or labor union are 
not voluntary in the same sense as a donation to a nonprofit or-
ganization. The ability of the nonprofit contributor to monitor 
the activities of the organization to which he contributes and to 
terminate contributions if he is displeased is much greater than 
with a shareholder or a labor union member. As a final point, we 
are concerned about the use of economic "war chests" in the .EQ_-
litical arena. Just because a corporation or labor union has a 
lot of money which it gained from its economic activities does 
not mean that its political viewpoints are supported to the same 
extent. That is, the amount of money spent (and money is in some 
sense speech) is not an accurate proxy for how widely the view-
point is held in society. In contrast, contributions to ideolog-
ical organizations are a much more accurate proxy of how widely 
the public supports the viewpoint, because the only reason to 
give to an ideological organization is to promote the ideas es-
poused. For these reasons, the government's interest in protect-
ing contributors to ideological organizations from the unwitting 
use of their con tr i but ions for political purposes appears much 
less strong than the government's interest in protecting corpo-
rate shareholders and labor union members from the same thing. 
If the statute imposes significant burdens without strong 
justifications as applied to a corporation like MCFL, it is nev-
ertheless necessary to determine whether the statute is as nar-
rowly drawn as possible to serve the objectives which apply to 
profit-making corporations and labor unions. Drawing a line be-
page 6. 
tween profit and nonprofit corporations would be simple, but may 
not accurately isolate those corporations which the FEC may not 
legitimately seek to regulate. Of course, this Court does not 
have to write a new statute, but in the inquiry as to whether the 
statute is narrowly tailored, it is relevant to determine whether 
a rational line other than between corporations and 
noncorporations can be drawn. Amicus Common Cause suggests some 
guidelines which address the legitimate concerns of Congress. 
Although they seem complex at first, they appear to be workable. 
Amicus would apply four factors to determine whether a corpora-
tion falls outside the restriction of §44lb: (1) the corporation 
must be a not-for-profit corporation that does not engage in 
business or commercial transactions of any kind; (2) the corpo-
ration must not have any shareholders or other affiliated persons 
with a claim to any of its assets or earnings; (3) the corpora-
tion must not have been established by a business corporation or 
labor union and it must not accept contributions from business 
corporations, labor unions or other artificial entities; and (4) 
the corporation must have been formed for the express purpose of 
promotion of political or ideological positions, and its sole 
source of funds must be voluntary contributions from individuals 
who have been informed that the funds will be spent for campaign-
related purposes. 
In sum, the question presented in this case is close, 
because there is no absolute limit on expenditures by a corpora-
tion like MCFL, only a regulatory burden. Nevertheless, because 
it appears that as applied to a small organization the burdens 
--
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are significant and that Congress could tailor the statute more 
narrowly to cover only corporations where the danger of corrup-
tion and misuse of contributors' funds is present, it appears 
that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to MCFL. 
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From: Justice Brennan 
Circulated: _ _:N_O_V _ _:5_ 19_8_6 __ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-701 
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, APPELLANT v. 
MASSACHUSETTS CITIZENS FOR LIFE, INC. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
[November-, 1986] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The questions for decision here arise under § 441b of the 
Federal Election Cam~~ Act (FECA or Act), 2 U. S. C. 
§§ 431-455 (1982). T~st question is whether respondent 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), a non-profit, 
non-stock corporation, by financing certain activity with its 
treasury funds, has violated the restriction on independent 
spending contained in § 441b of the Act. That section pro-
hibits corporations from using treasury funds to make an ex-
penditure "in connection with any election to any public of-
fice," and requires that any expenditure for such purpose be 
financed by voluntary contributions to ~arate segregated 
fund. If respondent has violated § 441~e next question is 
whether appfication ofthat section toMCFL's conduct is con-
stitutional. We hold that the respondent's use of its treas-
ury funds is p~ted by §441b, but that IT41b is uncon-
stit~ to the activity of which the Federal 
ElectiOn Commission (FEC or Commission) complains. 
I 
A 
MCFL was incorporated in January, 1973 as a non-profit, 
non-stock corporation under Massachusetts law. Its cor-
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porate purpose as stated in its articles of incorporation is 
"To foster respect for human life and to defend the right 
to life of all human beings, born and unborn, through 
educational, political and other forms of activities and in 
addition to engage in any other lawful act or activity for 
which corporations may be organized ... " 
App. 84. MCFL does not accept contributions from business 
corporations or unions. Its resources come from volUntary 
donations from Tt'members," and from various fund-raising ac-
tivities such as garage sales, bake sales, dances, raffles, and 
picnics. The corporation considers its "members" those per-
sons who have either contributed to the organization in the 
past or indicated support for its activities. 1 
Respondent has engaged in diverse educational and legisla-
tive activities designed to further its agenda. It has orga-
nized an ecumenical prayer service for the unborn in front of 
the Massachusetts State House; sponsored a regional confer-
ence to discuss the issues of abortion and euthenasia; pro-
vided speakers for discussion groups, debates, lectures, and 
media programs; and sponsored an annual March for Life. 
In addition, it has drafted and submitted legislation, some of 
which has become law in Massachusetts; sponsored testimony 
on proposed legislation; and has urged its members to contact 
their elected representatives to express their opinion on leg-
islative proposals. 
MCFL began publishing a newsletter in January, 1973. It 
was distributed as a matter of course to contributors, and, 
when funds permitted, to non-contributors who had ex-
1 MCFL concedes that under this Court's decision in Federal Election 
Commission v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U. S. 197 (1982), 
such a definition does not permit it to solicit contributions from such per-
sons for use by a separate segregated fund established under the Act. 
That case held that in order to be considered a "member" of an non-stock 
corporation under the Act, one must have "some relatively enduring and 
independently significant financial or organizational attachment" to the 
corporation. 459 U. S., at 204. 
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pressed support for the organization. The total distribution of 
any one issue has never exceeded 6,000. The newsletter 
was published irregularly from 1973 through 1978: three 
times in 1973, five times in 1974, eight times in 1975, eight 
times in 1976, five times in 1977, and four times in 1978. 
App. 88. Each of the newsletters bore a masthead identify-
ing it as the "Massachusetts Citizens for Life Newsletter," as 
well as a volume and issue number. The publication typi-
cally contained appeals for volunteers and contributions, and 
information on MCFL activities, as well as on matters such 
as the results of hearings on bills and constitutional amend-
ments, the status of particular legislation, the outcome of ref-
erenda, court decisions, and administrative hearings. 
Newsletter recipients were usually urged to contact the rele-
vant decision-makers and express their opinion. 
B 
In September 1978, MCFL prepared and distributed a 
"Special Election Edition" prior to the September 1978 pri-
macyeTections. While the May 1978 newsletter had been 
mailed to 2,109 people and the October 1978 newsletter to 
3,119 people, more than 100,000 copies of the "Special Elec-
tion Edition" were printed for distribution. The front page 
of the publication was headlined "EVERYTHING YOU 
NEED TO KNOW TO VOTE PRO-LIFE," and readers 
were admonished that "[n]o pro-life candidate can win in No-
vember without your vote in September." "VOTE PRO-
LIFE" was printed in large bold-faced letters on the back 
page, and a coupon was provided to be clipped and taken to 
the polls to remind voters of the name of the "pro-life" candi-
dates. Next to the exhortation to vote "pro-life" was a dis-
claimer: "This special election edition does not represent an 
endorsement of any particular candidate." App. 101. 
To aid the reader in selecting candidates, the flyer listed 
the candidates for each state and federal office in every vot-
ing district in Massachusetts, and identified each one as 
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either supporting or opposing what MCFL regarded as the 
correct position on three issues. A "y" indicated that a can-
didate supported the MCFL view on a particular issue and an 
"n" indicated that the candidate opposed it. An asterisk was 
placed next to the names of those incumbents who had made 
a "special contribution to the unborn in maintaining a 100% 
pro-life voting record in the state house by actively support-
ing MCFL legislation." While some 400 candidates were 
running for office in the primary, the "Special Edition" fea-
tured the photographs of only thirteen. These thirteen had 
received a triple "y" rating, or were identified either as hav-
ing a 100% favorable voting record or as having stated a posi-
tion consistent with that of MCFL. No candidate whose 
photograph was featured had received even one "n" rating. 
The "Special Edition" was edited by an officer of MCFL 
who was not part of the staff that prepared the MCFL news-
letters. The "Special Edition" was mailed free of charge and 
without request to 5,986 contributors, and to 50,674 others 
whom MCFL regarded as sympathetic to the organization's 
purposes. The Commission asserts that the remainder of 
the 100,000 issues were placed in public areas !for general dis-· 
tribution, but MCFL insists that no copies were made avail-
able to the general public. 2 The "Special Edition" was not 
identified on its masthead as a special edition of the regular 
newsletter, although the MCFL logotype did appear at its 
top. The words "Volume 5, No. 3, 1978" were apparently 
handwritten on the Edition submitted to the FEC, but the 
record indicates that the actual Volume 5, No. 3 was distrib-
uted in May-June, 1977. The corporation spent $9.812.,76 to 
publish and circulate the "Special Edition," all of which was 
taken from its general treasu!'Y funds. 
2 The FEC submitted an affidavit from a person who stated that she 
obtained a copy of the Special Election Edition at a statewide conference of 
the National Organization for Women, where a stack of about 200 copies 
were available to the general public. App. 174. 
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A complaint was filed with the Commission alleging that 
the "Special Edition" was a violation of § 441b. The com-
plaint maintained that the Edition represented an expendi-
ture of funds from a corporate treasury to distribute to the 
general public a campaign flyer on behalf of certain political 
candidates. The FEC found reason to believe that such a vi-
olation had occurred, initiated an investigation, and deter-
mined that probable cause existed to believe that MCFL had 
violated the Act. After conciliation efforts failed, the Com-
mission filed a complaint in the District Court under 
§ 437(g)(a)(6)(A), seeking a civil penalty and other appropri-
ate relief. 
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The District 
Court granted MCFL's motion, holding that: (1) the election 
publications could not be regarded as "expenditures" under 
§ 441b(b)(2); (2) the "Special Edition" was exempt from the 
statutory prohibition by virtue of§ 439(9)(B)(i), which in gen-
eral exempts news commentary distributed by a periodical 
publication unaffiliated with any candidate or political party; 
and (3) if the statute applied to MCFL, it was unconstitu-
tional as a violation of the First Amendment., 589 F. Supp. 
649 (D. Mass. 1984). 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held 
that the statute was applicable to MCFL, but affirmed the 
District Court's holding that the statute as so applied was un-
constitutional. 769 F. 2d 13 (CAl 1985). We granted cer-
tiorari, and now ~m. 
----.:_ II 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the "Special Edi-
tion" is not outside the reach of § 441b. First, we find no 
merit in respondent's contention that preparation and distri-
bution of the "Special Edition" does not fall within that sec-
tion's definition of "expenditure." Section 441b defines "con-
tribution or expenditure" as the provision of various things of 
value "to any candidate, campaign committee, or political 
party or organization, in connection with any election . . . " 
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(emphasis added). MCFL contends that, since it supplied 
nothing to any candidate or organization, the publication is 
not within § 441b. However, the general definitions section 
of the Act contains a broader definition of "expenditure," in-
cluding within that term the provision of anything of value 
made ''for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal 
office ... " 2 U. S. C. § 431(9)(A)(1). (emphasis added). 
Since the language of the statute does not alone resolve the 
issue, we must look to the legislative history of § 441b to de-
termine the scope of the term "expenditure." 3 
That history clearly confirms that § 441 b was meant to _£!"0-
scribe e n it e i co ne tion with an election. We have 
exhaustively recounted the legislative history of the prede-
cessors of this section in prior decisions. See Pipejitters Local 
Union 562 v. United States, 407 U. S. 385, 402-409 (1972); 
United States v. Auto Workers, 352 U. S. 567, 570-587 
(1957). This history makes clear that Congress has long re-
garded it as insufficient merely to restrict payments made di-
rectly to candidates or campaign organizations. The first ex-
plicit expression of this came in 1947, when the Taft-Hartley 
Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101 § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (1947), 
amended 18 U. S. C. § 610, the criminal statute prohibiting 
corporate contributions and expenditures to candidates. 
3 MCFL argues that the definition in the general definitions section is 
not as broad as it appears, for§ 431(9)(B)(v) of that section says that noth-
ing shall be considered an "expenditure" under § 431 that would not be re-
garded as such under§ 441b(b). Therefore, MCFL argues, the definition 
of expenditure under § 431 necessarily incorporates § 441b's restriction of 
that term to payments to a candidate. It is puzzling, however, why§ 431 
would in one subsection purport to define an expenditure as a payment 
made for the purpose of influencing an election and in another subsection 
eliminate precisely that type of activity from the ambit of its definition. 
The answer may lie in the fact that § 441(b)(2) says that expenditures "in-
clude" payments to a candidate, a term that indicates that activities not 
specifically enumerated in that section may nonetheless be encompassed by 
it. In any event, the need for such speculation signals that the language of 
the statute is not on its face dispositive. 
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The statute as amended forbade any corporation or labor 
organization to make a "contribution or expenditure in con-
nection with any election ... " for federal office. The 1946 
report of the House Special Committee to Investigate Cam-
paign Expenditures explained the rationale for the amend-
ment, noting that it would undermine the basic objective of 
§610 
"if it were assumed that the term 'making any contribu-
tion' related only to the donating of money directly, and 
excluded the vast expenditures of money in the activities 
herein shown to be engaged in extensively. Of what 
avail would a law be to prohibit the contributing direct to 
a candidate and yet permit the expenditure of large sums 
in his behalf? 
H. R. Rep. No. 2739, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1947), 
quoted in Auto Workers, supra, at 581. 
During the legislative debate on the bill, Senator Taft was 
asked whether § 610 permitted a newspaper published by a 
railway union to put out a special edition in support of a po-
litical candidate, or whether such activity would be consid-
ered a political expenditure. The Senator' replied, "If it 
were supported by union funds contributed by union mem-
bers as union dues it would be a violation of the law, yes. It 
is exactly as if a railroad itself, using stockholders' funds, 
published such an advertisement in the newspaper support-
ing one candidate as against another ... " 93 Cong. Rec. 
6436-6437 (1947). 
United States v. C/0, 335 U. S. 106 (1948), narrowed the 
scope of this prohibition, by permitting the use of union funds 
to publish a special edition of the weekly C/0 News distrib-
uted to union members and purchasers of the issue. In Auto 
Workers, supra, however, we held that a union was subject 
to indictment for using union dues to sponsor political ad-
vertisements on commercial television. Distinguishing C I 0, 
we stated that the concern of the statute "is the use of cor-
poration or union funds to influence the public at large to vote 
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for a particular candidate or a particular party." 352 U. S., 
at 589. 
The Federal Election Campaign Act enacted the prohi-
bition now found in § 441b. This portion of the Act simply 
ratified the existing understanding of the scope of§ 610. See 
Pipejitters, supra, at 410-411. Representative Hansen, the 
sponsor of the provision, declared: 
"The effect of this language is to carry out the basic in-
tent of section 610, which is to prohibit the use of union 
or corporate funds for active electioneering directed at 
the general public on behalf of a candidate in a Federal 
election." 
117 Cong. Rec. H43379 (1971). The representative 
concluded: 
"The net effect of the amendment, therefore, is to 
tighten and clarify the provisions of section 610 of title 
18, United States Code, and to codify the case law." 
lbid. 4 Thus, the fact that §441b uses the phrase "to any 
candidate ... in connection with any electiqn," while § 610 
provides "in connection with any federal election," is not evi-
dence that Congress abandoned its restriction, in force since 
1947, on expenditures on behalf of candidates. We therefore 
find no merit in MCFL's argument that only payments to a 
candidate or organization fall within the scope of§ 441b. 
Respondent next argues that the definition of an expendi-
ture under § 441b necessarily incorporates the requirement 
that a communication "expressly advocate" the election of 
candidates, and that its "Special Edition" does not constitute 
express advocacy. The argument relies on the portion of 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), that upheld the disclo-
sure requirement for expenditures by individuals other than 
candidates and by groups other than political committees. 
'See also 117 Cong. Rec. 43381 (remarks of Rep. Hays), 43383-43385 
(remarks of Rep. Thompson), 43388-43389 (remarks of Reps. Steiger and 
Gude). 
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See 2 U. S. C. § 434(c). There, in order to avoid problems of 
overbreadth, the Court held that the term "expenditure" en-
compassed "only funds used for communications that ex-
pressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified 
candidate." 424 U. S., at 80 (footnote omitted). The ra-
tionale for this holding was that 
"the distinction between discussion of issues and candi-
dates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates 
may often dissolve in practical application. Candidates, 
especially incumbents, are intimately tied to public is-
sues involving legislative proposals and governmental 
actions. Not only do candidates campaign on the basis 
of their positions on various issues, but campaigns them-
selves generate issues of public interest." 
ld., at 42 (footnote omitted). 
We agree with respondent that this rationale requires a 
similar construction of the more intrusive provision tha~ 
rectly regulates independent spending. We thereforeC!.!Q!d)l 
that an expenditure must constitute "express advocacy" in 
or r to be subJect to the rohihltion of §441b. We also 
o owever, that the publication of the "Special Edition" 
constitutes "express advocacy. tr - ~ 
Buckley adopted the "express advocacy" requirement to 
distinguish discussion of issues and candidates from more 
pointed exhortations to vote for particular persons. We 
therefore concluded in that case that a finding of "express ad-
vocacy" depended upon the use of language such as "vote 
for," "elect," "support," etc., Buckley, supra, at 44, n. 52. 
Just such exhoration appears in the "Sp~cial Edition." The 
publication not only urges voters to vote for "pro::Yife" candi-
dates, but also identifies and prov1des photo~aplis of specific 
canaidates fitting tna£<fe8Crlptro~ The E 1tfon cannot be 
regarded as a mere discussion of public issues that by their 
nature raise the names of certain politicians. Rather, it pro-
vides in effect an explicit directive: vote for these [named] 
candidates. The fact that this message is marginally less di-
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rect than "Vote for Smith" does not change its essential na-
ture. The Edition goes beyond issue discussion to express 
electoral advocacy. The disclaimer of endorsement cannot 
negate this fact. The Special Election Edition thus falls 
squarely within § 441b, for it represents express advocacy of 
the election of particular candidates distributed to members 
of the general public. 
Finally, MCFL argues that it is entitled to the press ex-
emption under 2 U. S. C. § 431(9)(B)(i) reserved for 
"any news story, commentary, or editorial distributed 
through the facilities of any ... newspaper, magazine, 
or other periodical publication, unless such facilities are 
owned or controlled by any political party, political com-
mittee, or candidate." 
MCFL maintains that its regular newsletter is a "periodi-
cal publication" within this definition, and that the "Special 
Edition" should be regarded as just another issue in the con-
tinuing newsletter series. The legislative history on the 
press exemption is sparse; the House of Representatives' Re-
port on this section states merely that the exemption was de-
signed to : 
"make it plain that it is not the intent of Congress in the 
present legislation to limit or burden in any way the first 
amendment freedoms of the press or of association. 
[The exemption] assures the unfettered right of the 
newspapers, TV networks, and other media to cover and 
comment on political campaigns." 
H. R. Rep. No. 93-1239, p. 4 (1974). We need not decide 
whether the regular MCFL newsletter is exempt under this 
provision, because, even assuming that it is, the "Special 
Edition" cannot be considered comparable to any single issue 
of the newsletter. It was not published through the facilities 
of the regular newsletter, but by a staff which prepared no 
previous or subsequent newsletters. It was not distributed 
to the newsletter's regular audience, but to a group twenty 
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times the size of that audience, most of whom were members 
of the public who had never received the newsletter. No 
characteristic of the Edition associated it in any way with the 
normal MCFL publication. The MCFL masthead did not ap-
pear on the flyer, and, despite an apparent belated attempt 
to make it appear otherwise, the Edition contained no volume 
and issue number identifying it as one in a continuing series 
of issues. 
MCFL protests that determining the scope of the press ex-
emption by reference to such factors inappropriately focuses 
on superficial considerations of form. However, it is pre-
cisely such factors that in combination permit the distinction 
of campaign flyers from regular publications. We regard 
such an inquiry as essential, since we cannot accept the no-
tion that the distribution of such flyers by entities that hap-
pen to publish newsletters automatically entitles such orga-
nizations to the press exemption. A contrary position would 
open the door for those corporations and unions with in-house 
publications to engage in unlimited spending directly from 
their treasuries to distribute campaign material to the gen-
eral public, thereby eviscerating § 441b's prohibition. 5 
In sum, we hold that MQ_fL's publication and distribution \ 
of the Special Election Edition is in viol2lon of i_44lb. We 
therefore turn to the constitutionality of that proVfSlon as ap-
plied to respondent. 
III 
A 
Independent expenditures constitute expression "at the 
core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment 
freedoms." Buckley, supra, at 39 (quoting Williams v. 
6 Nor do we find the Special Election Edition akin to the normal busi-
ness activity of a press entity deemed by some lower courts to fall within 
the exemption, such as the distribution of a letter soliciting subscriptions, 
see FEC v. Phillips Publishing Co., 517 F. Supp. 1308, 1313 (DDC 1981), 
or the dissemination of publicity, see Reader's Digest Association v. FEC, 
509 F. Supp. 1210 (SDNY 1981). 
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Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 32 (1968)). See also Federal Election 
Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Com-
mittee (NCPAC), -- U. S. --, (1985) (independent ex-
penditures "produce speech at the core of the First Amend-
ment"). We must therefore determine whether the 
prohibition of § 441b burdens political speech, and, if so, 
whether such a burden is justified by a compelling state in-
terest. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 44-45. 
The FEC contends that the Act does not infringe upon 
MCFL's First Amendment rights, since the corporation is 
free to establish a separate segregated fund that may engage 
in unlimited spending. Consideration of this argument re-
quires comparison of the regulations to which MCFL is sub-
ject by virtue of operating such a fund with those that would 
apply if it were not required to do so. 
If it were not incorporated, MCFL's obligations under the 
Act would be those specified by§ 434(c), the section that pre-
scribes the duties of "[e]very person (other than a political 
committee)." 6 Section 434(c) provides that any such person 
that during a year makes independent expenditures exceed-
ing $250 must: (1) identify all contributors : who contribute 
over $200 in the aggregate in a given year, § 434(c)(l); (2) dis-
close the name and address of recipients of independent ex-
penditures exceeding $200 in the aggregate, along with an in-
dication of whether the money was used to support or oppose 
a particular candidate, § 434(c)(2)(A); and (3) identify any per-
sons who make contributions over $200 that are earmarked 
for the purpose of furthering independent expenditures, 
§ 434(c)(2)(C). All unincorporated organizations whose 
6Jn Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), this Court said that an entity 
subject to regulation as a "political committee" under the Act is one that is 
either "under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is 
the nomination or election of a candidate." !d., at 79. It is undisputed on 
this record that MCFL fits neither of these descriptions. Its central orga-
nizational purpose is issue advocacy, although it occasionally engages in ac-
tivities on behalf of political candidates. 
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major purpose is not campaign advocacy, but who occas.ion-
ally make independent expenditures on behalf of candidates, 
are subject only to these regulations. 
Because it is incorporated, however, MCFL must establish 
a "separate segregated fund" if it wishes to engage in any in-
dependent spending whatsoever. § 441b(a),(b)(2)(C). Since 
such a fund is considered a "political committee" under the 
Act,§ 431(4)(B), all MCFL independent expenditure activity, 
is as a result, regulated as though the organization's major 
purpose is to further the election of candidates. This me~ns 
that MCFL must comply with several requirements in addi-
tion to those mentioned. Under §432, it must appoint _a 
treasurer, § 432(a); ensure that contributions are forwarded 
to the treasurer within ten or thirty days of receipt, depend-
ing on the amount of contribution, § 432(b)(2); see that its 
treasurer keeps an account of: every contribution regardless 
of amount, the name and address of any person who makes .a 
contribution in excess of $50, all contributions received from 
political committees, and the name and address of any perso_n 
to whom a disbursement is made regardless of amount, 
§ 432(c); and preserve receipts for all disbursements over 
$200 and all records for three years, § 432(c),(d). Under 
§ 433, MCFL must file a statement of organization containing 
its name, address, the name of its custodian of records, and 
its banks, safety deposit boxes, or other depositori~s, 
§ 433(a),(b); report any change in the above information 
within ten days, § 433(c); and may dissolve only upon filing a 
written statement that it will no longer receive any contribu-
tions nor make disbursements, and that it has no outstanding 
debts or obligations, § 433(d)(l). 
Under § 434, MCFL must file either monthly reports with 
the FEC or reports on the following schedule: quarterly re-
ports during election years, a pre-election report no later 
than the twelfth day before an election, a post-election report 
within 30 days after an election, and reports every six 
months during non-election years, § 434(a)(4)(A),(B). These 
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reports must contain information regarding the amount of 
cash on hand; the total amount of receipts, detailed by ten dif-
ferent categories; the identification of each political commit-
tee and candidate's authorized or affiliated committee making 
contributions, and any persons making loans, providing re-
bates, refunds, dividends, or interest or any other offset to 
operating expenditures in an aggregate amount over $200; 
the total amount of all disbursements, detailed by twelve dif-
ferent categories; the names of all authorized or affiliated 
committees to whom expenditures aggreggating over $200 
have been made; persons to whom loan repayments or re-
funds have been made; the total sum of all contributions, op-
erating expenses, outstanding debts and obligations, and the 
settlement terms of the retirement of any debt or obligation. 
§ 434(b). In addition, MCFL may solicit contributions for its 
separate segregated fund only from its "members," 
441b(4)(A),(C), which does not include those persons who 
have merely contributed to or indicated support for the orga-
nization in the past. See National Right to Work Commit-
tee, 459 U. S., at 204. 
It is evident from this survey that MCFL is subject to 
more extensive re uiTeiilents and more strin ent restri~tions 
than it would be If it were not incor orate . These addi-
tional regulations may create a disincentive for such orga-
nizations to engage in political speech. Detailed record-
keeping an<raiSCTOsure oblrgatiOn~along with the duty to 
appoint a treasurer and custodian of the records, impose ad-
ministrative costs that many small entities may be unable to 
bear. 7 Furthermore, such duties require a far more com-
7 It is true that we acknowledged in Buckley, supra, that, although the 
reporting and disclosure requirements of the Act "will deter some individ-
uals who otherwise might contribute," id., at 68, this is a burden that is 
justified by substantial government interests. I d., at 66-68. However, 
while the effect of additional reporting and disclosure obligations on an 
organization's contrilrutors may not necessarily constitute an additional . 
burden on speech, the administrative costs of complying with such in-
. '
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plex and formalized organization than many small groups 
could manage. Restriction of solicitation of contributions to 
"members" either vastly reduces the sources of funding for 
organizations with no formal members, or requires the cre-
ation of some type of organizational affiliation, sufficiently 
documented, for those persons who would be solicited. It is 
not unreasonable to suppose that, as in this case, an incorpo-
rated group of like-minded persons might seek donations to 
support the dissemination of their political ideas, and their 
occasional endorsement of political candidates, by means of 
garage sales, bake sales, and raffles. Such persons might 
well be turned away by the prospect of complying with all the 
requirements imposed by the Act. Faced with the need to 
assume a more sophisticated organizational form, to adopt 
specific accounting procedures, to file periodic detailed re-
ports, and to monitor garage sales lest non-members take a 
fancy to the merchandise on display, it would not be surpris-
ing if at least some groups decided that the contemplated po-
litical activity was simply not worth it. 8 
Thus, while § 441b does not remove all op ortunities for in-
dependen spen mg y orgamzations sue as CFL, the av-
enUe1tle'aVeSOpen is more burdensome than the one it fore-
closes. TlieTaa that the statute's practical effect may be to 
discourage protected speech is sufficient to characterize 
§ 441b as an infringement on First Amendment activities. 
In Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 (1965), for instance, 
we held that the absence of certain procedural safeguards 
rendered unconstitutional a state's film censorship program. 
Such procedures were necessary, we said, because, as a prac-
creased responsibilities may create a disincentive for the organization itself 
to speak. 
8 The fact that MCFL established a political committee in 1980 does not 
change this conclusion, for the corporation's speech may well have been in-
hibited due to its inability to form such an entity before that date. Fur-
thermore, other organizations comparable to MCFL may not find it feasi-
ble to establish such a committee, and may therefore decide to forego 
engaging in independent political speech . 
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tical matter, without them "it may prove too burdensome to 
seek review of the censor's determination." I d., at 59. 
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958), reviewed a state 
program under which taxpayers applying for a certain tax ex-
emption bore the burden of proving that they did not advo-
cate the overthrow of the United States and would not sup-
port a foreign government against this country. We noted, 
"In practical operation, therefore, this procedural device 
must necessarily produce a result which the State could not 
command directly. It can only result in a deterrence of 
speech which the Constitution makes free." I d., at 526. 
The same may be said of § 441b, for its practical effect is to 
make engaging in protected speech a severely demanding 
task. 9 
B 
When a statutory provision burdens First Amendment 
rights, it must be justified by a compelling state interest. 
Williams v. Rhodes, supra, 393 U.S., at "31; NAACP v. But-
ton, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963). The FEC first insists that 
justification for § 441b's expenditure restriction is provided 
by this Court's acknowledgment that "the special characteris-
tics of the corporate structure require particularly careful 
regulation." National Right to Work Committee, supra, at 
209-210. The Commission thus relies on the long history of 
regulation of corporate political activity as support for the 
9 The Commission relies on Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 
461 U. S. 540 (1983), in support of its contention that the requirement that 
independent spending be conducted through a separate segregated fund 
does not burden MCFL's First Amendment rights. Regan, however, in-
volved the requirement that a non-profit corporation establish a separate 
lobbying entity if contributions to the corporation for the conduct of other 
activities were to be tax-deductible. If the corporation chose not to set up 
such a lobbying arm, it would not be eligible for tax-deductible contribu-
tions. Such a result, however, would infringe no protected activity, for 
there is no right to have speech subsidized by the government. 461 U. S., 
at 545-546. By contrast, the activity that may be discouraged in this case, 
independent spending, is core political speech under the First Amendment. 
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application of § 441b to MCFL. Evaluation of the Commis-
sion's argument requires close examination of the underlying 
rationale for this long-standing regulation. 
It is true that this Court has consistently noted with ap-
proval the series of Congressional efforts to restrict the di-
rect participation of corporations in electoral affairs. See 
National Right to Work Committee, 459 U. S., at 208-210; 
Pipejitters, supra, at 402-409; Auto Workers, supra, at 
570-87. Those efforts, however, have been prompted by 
concerns that are not implicated by the activity of organiza-
tions such as respondent. In upholding a different provision 
of§ 441b in National Right to Work Committee, supra, we 
described that section as an attempt to regulate the "substan-
tial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advan-
tages which go with the corporate form of organization." 
459 U. S., at 207. We later characterized that decision as 
upholding a provision designed to restrict "the influence of 
political war chests funneled through the corporate form." 
NCPAC, supra, at-- (1985). In Pipejitters, supra, we 
observed that the objective of predecessor s'tatute § 610 was 
to "eliminate the effect of aggregated wealth on federal elec-
tions." 407 U. S., at 416. In Auto Workers, supra, we held 
that a labor union could be indicted under § 610 for sponsor-
ing a campaign broadcast intended for the general public, 
given consistent Congressional efforts to curb the political in-
fluence of "those who exercise control over large aggrega-
tions of capital." 352 U. S., at 567. 
This concern over the corrosive influence of concentrated 
wealth reflects the conviction that it is important to protect 
the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas. It ac-
knowledges the wisdom of Justice Holmes' observation that 
"the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in 
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought 
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . " 
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Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes 
and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting). 10 
Direct corporate spending on political activity raises the 
prospect that resources amassed in the economic marketplace 
may be used to provide an unfair advantage in the political 
marketplace. Political "free trade" does not necessarily re-
quire that all who participate in the political marketplace do 
so with exactly equal resources. See NCPAC, supra, at 
-- (1985)(invalidating limits on independent spending by 
political committees); Buckley, supra, at 39-51 (striking 
down expenditure limits in 1971 Campaign Act). Relative 
availability of funds is after all a rough barometer of public 
support. The resources in the treasury of a business cor-
poration, however, are not an indication of popular support 
for the corporation's political ideas. They reflect instead the 
economically motivated decisions of investors and customers. 
The availability of these resources may make a corporation a 
formidable political presence, even though the power of the 
corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas. 
By requiring that corporate independent expenditures be 
financed through a political committee expressly established 
to engage in campaign spending, § 441b seeks to prevent this 
threat to the political marketplace. The resources available 
to this fund, as opposed to the corporate treasury, in fact re-
flect popular support for the political positions of the commit-
tee. Pipejitters, supra, acknowledged this objective of 
§ 441b in noting the statement of Representative Hansen, its 
10 While this market metaphor has guided Congressional regulation in 
the area of campaign activity, First Amendment speech is not necessarily 
limited to such an instrumental role. As Justice Brandeis stated in his dis-
cussion of political speech in his concurrence in Whitney v. California: 
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state 
was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government 
the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued lib-
erty both as an end and as a means. 
274 u. s. 357, 375 (1927). 
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sponsor, that the "underlying theory" of this regulation "is 
that substantial general purpose treasuries should not be di-
verted to political purposes," and that requiring funding by 
voluntary contributions would ensure that "the money col-
lected is that intended by those who contribute to be used for 
political purposes and not money diverted from another 
source." 407 U. S., at 423-424 (quoting 117 Cong. Rec. 
43381).u See also Auto Workers, supra, at 582 (Congress 
added proscription on expenditures to Corrupt Practices Act 
"to protect the political process from what it deemed to be 
the corroding effect of money employed in elections by aggre-
gated power"). The expenditure restrictions of § 441b are 
thus meant to ensure that competition among actors in the 
political arena is truly competition among ideas. 
Regulation of co~ity t~ected 
concern not about use of the cor r te form er se, but about 
the otential for unfair deployment of wealth for olitical pur-
poses.12 Groups such as MCFL, however, do not pose that 
danger of corruption. MCFL was formed to disseminate po-
litical ideas, not to amass capital. The resources it has avail-
able are not a function of its success in the economic market-
place, but its popularity in the political marketplace. While 
MCFL may derive some advantages from its corporate form, 
11 While business corporations may not represent the only organizations 
that pose this danger, they are by far the most prominent example of enti-
ties that enjoy legal advantages enhancing their ability to accumulate 
wealth. That Congress does not at present seek to regulate every possi-
ble type of firm fitting this description does not undermine its justification 
for regulating corporations. Rather, Congress' decision represents the 
"careful legislative adjustment of the federal electoral laws, in a 'cautious 
advance, step by step,'" to which we have said we owe considerable defer-
ence. National Right to Work Committee, supra, 459 U. S., at 209 (quot-
ing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp ., 301 U. S. 1, 46 (1937). 
'
2 The regulation imposed as a result of this concern is of course distin-
guishable from the complete foreclosure of any opportunity for political 
speech that we invalidated in the state referendum context in First N a-
tional Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978) 
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those are advantages that redound to its benefit as a political 
organization, not as a profit-making enterprise. In short, 
MCFL is not the type of "traditional corporation[] organized 
for economic gain," NCPAC, supra, at--, that has been 
the focus of regulation of corporate political activity. 
National Right to Work Committee, supra, does not sup-
port the inclusion of MCFL within § 441b's restriction on di-
rect independent spending. That case upheld the application 
to a non-profit corporation of a different provision of § 441b: 
the limitation on who can be solicited for contributions to a 
political committee. However, the political activity at issue 
in that case was contributions, as the committee had been es-
tablished for the purpose of making direct contributions to 
political candidates. 459 U. S., at 200. We have consist-
ently held that restrictions on contributions re uire less com-
pellin ·ustification than res r1ctions on mde endent spend-
~· N PA , .. , a --;California Me tea ssn. v. 
Federal Election Commission, 453 U. S. 182, 194, 196-197 
(1981); Buckley, supra, at 20-22. 
In light of the historical role of contributions in the corrup-
tion of the electoral process, the need for a broad prophylac-
tic rule was thus sufficient in National Right to Work Com-
mittee to support a limitation on the ability of a committee to 
raise money for direct contributions. This case, however, 
involves core political speech, the regulation of which de-
mands far greater precision than § 441b provides. The de-
sirability of a broad prophylactic rule cannot justify treating 
alike business corporations and respondent in the regulation 
of independent spending. 
The Commission next argues in support of§ 441b that that 
it prevents an organization from using an individual's money 
for purposes that the individual may not support. We ac-
knowledged the legitimacy of this concern as to the dissent-
ing stockholder and union member in National Right to 
Work, supra, at 208, and in Pipe.fitters, supra, at 414-15. 
But such persons, as noted, contribute investment funds or 
85-701-0PINION 
FEC v. MASSACHUSETTS CITIZENS FOR LIFE 21 
union dues for economic gain, and do not necessarily author-
ize the use of their money for political ends. Furthermore, 
because such individuals depend on the organization for in-
come or for a job, it is not enough to tell them that any unhap-
piness with the use of their money can be redressed simply 
by leaving the corporation or the union. It was thus wholly 
reasonable for Congress to require the establishment of a 
separate political fund to which persons can make voluntary 
contributions. 
This rationale for regulation is not compelling with respect 
to independent expenditures by respondent. Individuals \ 
who contribute to respondent are fully aware of its political r 
purposes, and in fact contribute precisely because they sup-
port those purposes. It is true that a contributor may not be 
aware of the exact use to which his or her money ultimately 
may be put, or the specific candidate that it may be used to 
support. However, individuals contribute to a political orga-
nization in part because they regard such a contribution as a 
more effective means of advocacy than spending the money 
under their own personal direction. Any contribution there-
fore necessarily involves at least some degree of delegation of 
authority to use such funds in a manner that best serves the 
shared political purposes of the organization and contributor. 
In addition, an individual desiring more direct control over 
the use of his or her money can simply earmark the contribu-
tion for a specific purpose, an option whose availability does 
not depend on the applicability of § 441b. Cf. § 434(c)(2)(C) 
(entities other than political committees must disclose names 
of those persons making earmarked contributions over $200). 
Finally, a contributor dissatisfied with how funds are used 
can simply stop contributing. 
The Commission maintains that, even if contributors may 
be aware that a contribution to respondent will be used for 
political purposes in general, they may not wish such money 
to be used for electoral campaigns in particular. That is, 
persons may desire that an organization use their contribu-
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tions to further a certain cause, but may not want the orga-
nization to use their money to urge support for or opposition 
to political candidates solely on the basis of that cause. This 
concern can be met, however, by means far more narrowly 
tailored and less burdensome than § 441b's restriction on di-
rect expenditures: simply requiring that contributors be in-
formed that their money may be used for such a purpose. 
It is true that National Right to Work, supra, held that the 
goal of protecting minority interests justified solicitation re-
strictions on a non-profit corporation operating a political 
committee established to make direct contributions to candi-
dates. As we have noted above, however, the government 
enjoys greater latitude in limiting contributions than in regu-
lating independent expenditures. Supra, at --. Given a 
contributor's awareness of the political activity of the re-
spondent, as well as the readily available remedy of refusing 
further donations, the interest protecting contributors is sim-
ply insufficient to support § 441b's restriction on the inde-
pendent spending of MCFL. 
Finally, the FEC maintains that the inapplicability of 
§ 441b to MCFL would open the door to massive undisclosed 
political spending by similar entities, and to their use as con-
duits for undisclosed spending by business corporations and 
unions. We see no such danger. Even if§ 441b is inapplica-
ble, an in~iture of as little as $250 by MCFL 
will trigger the disclosure provisions of§ 434(c). As a result, 
MCFL will be re uired to identify all contributors who pro-
vide annual a egate n s excee mg 2 , willn ave to 
specify all recip en s o m epen en spen mg amounting to 
more than $200, and will be bound to identify all persons 
making contributions over $200 who request that the money 
be used for independent expenditures. These reporting ob-
ligations provide precisely the information necessary to moni-
tor MCFL's independent spending activity and its receipt of 
contributions. The state interest in disclosure therefore can 
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be met in a manner less restrictive than imposing the full 
panoply of regulations that accompany status as a political 
committee under the Act. 
Furthermore, should MCFL's independent spending be-
come so extensive that the organization's major purpose may 
be regarded as campaign activity, the corporation would be 
classified as a political committee. See Buckley, supra, at 
79. As such, it would automatically be subject to the obliga-
tions and restrictions applicable to those groups whose pri-
mary objective is to influence political campaigns. In sum, \ 
there is no need for the sake of disclosure to treat MCFL any 
differently than other organizations that only occasionally en-
gage in independent spending on behalf of candidates. 
c 
Our conclusion is that § 441b's r~%ic:ioMC~ependent 
s ending is unconstitutional as app 1e o L, for it in-
fringes protected speec wit ou a compel ing justification 
for such infringement. We acknowledge the legitimacy of 
Congress' concern that organizations that amass eat wealth 
in t~e e1cono~i~ketp~e not gam un air a vantage in the poh 1ca mar e place. Not all corpora_lli>ns, however, impli-
cat:e this co~ern. Some n ave feat!!!'eS moi_e akin to v olun-
ta~ns than business firms, and therefore 
should not have to bear burdens on independent spending 
solely because of their incorporated status. Such corpora-
tions have three features in common, and an organization 
must possess aifthre~ from the reach of §441b's 
restriction on independent spending. cE]itt, a corporation 
must be formed for the express purpose of promoting politi-
cal ideas, and cannot engage in business activities. If politi-
cal fundraising events are expressly denominated as requests 
for contributions that will be used for political purposes, in-
cluding direct expenditures, these events cannot be consid-
ered business activities. This ensures that political re-
? 
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sources reflect political support. Second, the corporation l 
must have no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to 
have a claim on its assets or earnings. This ensures that 
persons connected with the organization will have no eco-
nomic disincentive for disassociating with it if they disagree 
with its political activity. 13 Third, the corporation may not 
be established by a business corporation or a labor union, nor 
may it accept contri~~ This pre-
vents such corporations from serving as conduits for the type 
of direct spending that may constitutionally be proscribed 
under the Act. 
It may be that the class of organizations affected by our 
holding today will be small. That prospect, however, does 
not diminish the significance of the rights at stake. Free-
dom of speech plays a fundamental role in a democracy; as 
this Court has said, freedom of thought and speech "is the 
matrix, the indispensible condition, of nearly every other 
form of freedom." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 327 
(1937). Our pursuit of other governmental ends, however, 
may tempt us to accept in small increments a loss that would 
be unthinkable if inflicted all at once. For: this reason, we 
must be as vigilant against the modest diminution of speech 
we are as against its sweeping restriction. Where at all pos-
sible, government must curtail speech only to the degree nec-
essary to meet the particular problem at hand, and must 
avoid infringing on speech that does not pose the danger that 
has prompted regulation. In enacting the provision at issue 
'
8 This restriction does not deprive such organizations of "members" that 
can be solicited for donations to a separate segregated fund that makes con-
tributions to candidates, a fund that, under our decision in National Right 
to Work Committee, supra, must be established by all corporations wishing 
to make such candidate contributions. National Right to Work requires 
that "members" have either a "financial or organizational attachment" to 
the corporation, 459 U. S., at 204 (emphasis added). Our decision today 
merely states that a corporation may not have persons affiliated finan-
cially if it is to fall outside § 441b's prohibition on direct expenditures. 
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in this case, Congress has chosen too blunt an instrument for 
such a delicate task. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
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